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Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to verify whether school resource factors have an impact on the
quality of education. This latter is measured with the help of a unique database on student
scores in international skills tests. The general difficulties inherent in this type of study are the
possibility of endogeneity bias and measurement errors. After estimation bias correction, we
show that improvement in the quality of educational systems does not necessarily require an
increase in school resources. When an alternative indicator of the performance of educational
systems is used, our results are confirmed. Consequently, one should remain cautious about
recommending purely financial measures to improve quality of education.
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21. Introduction
The majority of countries throughout the world devote between 1% and 11% of their GDP
to education; equally often, this item of expenditure accounts for one fifth of government
spending. Given the rapid growth and large magnitude of education spending, governments
have been increasingly interested in ways of controlling education costs. One possible
strategy is to modify the institutional structure of the educational system in order to improve
the quality of education. There is a lack of clear consensus on whether the quality of an
educational system can be improved simply by increasing educational expenditure. More
generally, school resource factors as a whole do not appear to explain school performance in
any satisfactory manner. In one of the very first studies in this field, Coleman et al. (1966)
found very weak effects of school resources on student performance. Their report was very
influential, giving rise to several hundred articles seeking to measure the impact of school
resource variables on student performance. Effects such as class size, the level of educational
expenditure and teachers’ pay were tested.
Recent exchanges between Eric Hanushek and Alan Krueger underline the lack of
consensus about the validity of a relation between educational inputs (such as spending) and
the output of the system, often measured by students’ scores in skills tests. For example,
Hanushek (1998) and Krueger (1998, 2000) analyze the panel data on educational expenditure
and the results of NAEP tests (National Assessment of Educational Progress) in the United
States. The NAEP is a survey of American students’ acquired skills in reading, writing,
mathematics and science. From his analysis, Krueger concludes that the increase in spending
has led to a slight increase in students’ scores, whereas Hanushek finds no clear and robust
relation between school resources and student performance.
The aim of this paper is to test the extent to which school resource factors influence
educational performance. This latter is measured by the quality of education, itself estimated
3on the basis of international surveys on student skills. The aim is to calculate an educational
production function (EPF) in which an output (the quality of education) is related to certain
inputs (school resource factors). Although many studies have estimated the relation between
educational inputs and student test scores, these studies are most often based on
microeconomic analyses. International comparisons are rare, due to the lack of comparable
and homogeneous data. Below, we describe the most influential studies in this field.
Two major studies (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Lee and Barro, 2001) have been
conducted into the relation between educational variables and test results, using aggregate
data. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) construct an international database of student test scores
for a sample of 39 countries (for the complete methodology, see Hanushek and Kim, 1995).
To test for the existence of an educational production function, the authors regress the
measurements of educational performance with input indicators. They emphasize that the
conventional measurements of education (such as class size at primary level, government
spending per student or the share of GDP allocated to educational expenditure) have no
significant effect on the results achieved in the international tests.
Lee and Barro (2001) look for the determinants of school quality in a panel database that
includes measurements of education inputs and outputs for a larger number of countries. The
authors take into account the results in mathematics, science and reading for students of
different ages, in the same surveys as those used by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), for several
years from 1964 and 1991. To the contrary of Hanushek and Kimko (2000), they show that
school resources, including teachers’ pay, have a significant impact on the skills tests, while
class size have a significant negative effect on test scores.
Other works have performed the same type of estimation. Al Samarrai (2002) presents a
review of the literature together with further results. Without testing survey data, Gupta,
Verhoeven and Tiongson (1999) show the need to differentiate between countries according
4to their economic level in the estimation of the educational production function. Finally,
Hanushek and Luque (2003) carry the analyses of Hanushek and Kimko (2000) further. More
complete reviews of the literature can be found in Leclercq (2005) and Al Samarrai (2002).
In itself, we do not take into account, in this paper, the dimension relating to the
organization of educational systems or the internal workings of the “black box” that they
constitute. Our viewpoint is from a macroeconomic level, centered rather on the concept of
educational production function. The objective here is to assess the extent to which school
resource factors do or do not affect levels of school performance.
Nevertheless, compared with previous works, this paper proposes several advances. Firstly,
we take into account two different indicators for the measurement of educational
performance, where most of the studies limit themselves to one. Using two complementary
measurements gives us the possibility of verifying the validity of our results. Further, our
comparative international study adopts a panel perspective, enabling us to control for
unobservable fixed effects. In fact, most of the previous studies do not control for bias due to
omitted variables and fixed effects. Because we have panel data, we can take into account all
the invariant effects whose characteristics are specific to the countries’ educational systems.
Another advantage of the panel database is that it enables us to take into account the possible
endogeneity of school resource factors. To our knowledge, no other macroeconomic study
uses regressors to purge endogeneity bias. Yet it seems fairly logical to imagine that a double
relation of causality might exist between resource factors and the performance of educational
systems. For example, an educational system may perform well because classes are small in
size. In parallel, because of its high performance, the government may opt for a voluntary
reduction in class size. Other examples can be found, and they all underline the need to take
into account the bias generated by this possible endogeneity. That is we set out to do in this
paper.
5The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the methodology
used to construct our data on the quality of education (which we call the "qualitative
indicators of human capital" or QIHC) and the other input indicators. Section 3 presents the
modelling and the main results obtained. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. Database relative to the quality of education
The data used to measure the quality of education comes from the international surveys on
educational achievement. Since 1964, international tests are administered to students from
different countries in order to evaluate their level on mathematics, science and other skills.
These qualitative indicators of human capital (QIHC) can be considered an alternative to the
strictly quantitative variables of education, such as school enrollment. The studies by
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Lee and Barro (2001) have already adopted such an
approach.
Strictly speaking, the aim is to quantify, on a scale of 1 to 100, the quality of education, or
more precisely the scores of representative samples of students from different countries in
international achievement tests. We take into account 6 groups of international surveys into
student achievement. Our data have been taken from Lee and Barro (2001) for the surveys
prior to 1995 and from the official reports for the other surveys (see table 2 for a presentation
of the surveys). Below, we present the general methodology. For a more detailed presentation,
see Altinok and Murseli (2007) and Altinok (2009)2.
2 The database used in this paper is the same of the one which can be found in Altinok and Murseli (2007). The
updated database presented in Altinok (2009) is slightly different. Please see Altinok (2009) for the differences
between the two databases.
6We have used the most recent results from 6 different groups of international surveys
(IEA, PISA, SACMEQ, PASEC, LLECE and MLA3). For the meaning of all these initials,
see the note to Table 2. Previous analyses have used surveys from the period 1961 to 1990,
without considering the question of their quality. Lee and Barro (2001), for example, took the
scores for all the tests available between these two dates, for all the skills tested, without any
readjustment. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) took into account the quality of the data, to a
certain extent, by weighting the gross results by standard errors. But they re-calibrated the
data solely on the basis of the American NAEP survey (National Assessment of Educational
Progress). The authors assumed that the results from this survey were sufficient for overall
anchoring of the data. In addition, they did not take into account the results of surveys
conducted after 1990. Yet most international surveys actually started after this date. Widening
the analysis to cover all the available surveys can, in particular, help us to confirm or disprove
the results of previous studies.
The database is in the form of a panel, covering the period 1964-2005. We compile the
results from all the surveys measuring student achievements at primary and secondary level.
We have two groups of surveys: those in which the United States took part (series A), where
we can anchor the data to a specific survey (NAEP), and those in which the United States did
not take part (series B), where we anchor the data on countries that have taken part in several
different surveys. The anchoring we use in series A, on the American NAEP survey, is the
same as that used by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). The NAEP has been the principal tool for
measuring student achievements in the United States since 1969. The IAEP is the
international equivalent of the NAEP. Thus, the procedure of evaluation is based on American
curricula. At different periods since 1970, American students aged 9, 13 and 17 have been
3 For the meaning of all these initials, see the note to Table 2.
7tested on their achievements in science and mathematics. These tests provide an absolute
measurement of reference for the level of achievements in the United States. In order to
collect the data from both the IEA and the IAEP surveys at the same time, Hanushek and
Kimko (2000) used the American results as "references". Thus, they modified the means of
the IEA surveys to make them equal to the nearest means in the IEAP surveys (for age, school
year and skill tested). Unlike Hanushek and Kimko, in order to obtain indicators comparable
to those obtained in series B, we have not re-weighted the scores by the measurement errors.
For series B – the surveys in which the United States did not take part – we have adopted the
methodology of anchoring. This consists in evaluating the level of difficulty of the different
tests based on the results of countries that have taken part in several different surveys. For
example, if country x performs better in test A than in test B, with the two tests taking place at
about the same date, then we can assume that test A is easier than test B, and a readjustment
proportional to the difficulty is therefore necessary. In the end, we obtain 42 series of tests for
all age groups (9, 10, 13, 14, 15). As a next step, given that certain series concern the same
year and the same level of schooling (primary or secondary), grouping these together brings
the final number of test series down to 26.
In this study, we use the scores in mathematics, because this is a skill that is easier to
compare between countries than reading or science. Furthermore, we use the standardized
tests for secondary education, because this is probably the most appropriate educational level
for measuring the quality of education. This is also the level for which we have the most
observations. It should be noted that our sample is relatively small and unbalanced, because
not all the countries took part in all the surveys. Nevertheless, it does enable us to perform
econometric analyses that can confirm or disprove previous studies. In addition, to make up
for the lack of data and to be able to compare results, we use another educational output (the
net enrolment rate at secondary education, see below).
82.2. Database relative to school factors and alternative output measure
As well as the qualitative variables on education constructed and described above, we have
also used a set of input variables, to estimate the school production function. For the data
from the period 1960-1990, these are drawn mainly from the database of Barro and Lee
(1996). The following variables are considered: teacher pay at primary school level as a
percentage of GDP per capita (variable SHSALP), class size at primary and secondary school
level (variables TEAPRI and TEASEC respectively), government spending on education per
student as a percentage of GDP per capita (variables SHPUPP and SHPUPS, for primary and
secondary levels respectively) and repetition rates (REPPRI and REPSEC). As these data are
only available up until 1990, we have updated them by drawing mainly on data from
UNESCO and the World Bank (see UNESCO, 2004, 2005, 2007 and World Bank, 2002,
2007). As regards the variable SHSALP, we have estimated it using data available from
UNESCO and then completed the missing data from the World Bank (2002). We have
calculated teachers’ pay as a percentage of GDP per capita by dividing the total amount paid
to teachers over one year by the number of teachers employed during the year in question.
The variable SHSALP is then obtained by expressing this as a fraction of GDP per capita. The
variables of government spending on education per student have been updated using data
extracted from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics: these are expressed as percentages of
GDP per capita, for primary and secondary school levels separately.
The variable concerning the average number of years in education for those aged 25 or
over (variable ADEDU) has been drawn from Barro and Lee (2001). In their study, Lee and
Barro (2001) preferred to use the average number of years spent by adults in primary school
education, without giving any specific justification. They even pointed out that they had not
included the average number of years spent in secondary education because the variable was
9not significant. Consequently, we prefer to use the number of years spent in school by adults
without distinguishing between the levels of education, for there are no grounds for not
including the years spend in secondary education and above. As the sample of countries
available in the database of Barro and Lee (2001) is fairly small, we have predicted the
variable ADEDU from the school life expectancy (expressed in years), available in the
UNESCO databases (see UNESCO, 2004 and 2005). These two variables are closely linked
by a lag effect: as a general rule, the school life expectancy for youngsters is higher than that
for adults, for the first variable takes into account evolutions in the school enrollment of the
young.
Indicators of educational inequalities have been drawn from Altinok (2007). These
indicators cover several dimensions of inequality in education by grouping together Gini
index scores and other forms of inequality (notably gender inequalities and drop-out school
rate). See Altinok (2007) for a presentation of the methodology. The values of the index range
from 0 to 100; the higher the value, the higher the level of inequalities. The data are available
for the period 1960-2000, with intervals of 5 years between each observation.
To compare the results, we use a second indicator of educational expenditure: spending on
education as a percentage of GDP. Although it is impossible for us to distinguish between
each level of education, this indicator can serve as an alternative to the above measurements.
The data are drawn from UNESCO and are available for the period 1970-2005. The sources
of the data are indicated in Table 1. In addition, elements of descriptive statistics are presented
in Table 3.
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2.3. Drawbacks relative to the qualitative indicators of human capital
Although the methodology used was designed to measure level of equivalence between the
different surveys, it has its limits. Three such limits are discussed below, although there may
be others.
The first concerns the anchoring of data to scores obtained in the United States of America.
When gauging the difficulty of a particular survey, its data are adjusted to the score of the
United States of America both in the survey and in the NAEP. This implies that the NAEP is a
sound benchmark for measuring the performance in the United States of America. Yet the
published NAEP findings may include a measure of distortion, which could in turn lead to
distortion when adjusting the survey concerned. Nevertheless, the anchoring of data on a
separate source is the only known procedure for the optimal calibration of surveys in relation
to each other. Ideally, data on learning achievement since the mid-1960s should be available
for another country, but only the United States of America is believed to have compiled such
data at the time. Moreover, to avoid adjustments reliant on the NAEP only, an anchoring
methodology is used which consists of an identical linear conversion for surveys administered
by the same body (the “general NAEP anchoring methodology”).
Furthermore, the nature of the skills assessed may differ from survey to survey, in which
case the surveys may not be readily comparable. While some surveys (such as the IEA
surveys) tend to measure learning achievement in terms of knowledge, others (such as the
OECD surveys) focus more on the level of pupils’ skills. In this particular case, any
equivalence established may be distorted, as the “products” of education measured in this way
are not clearly equivalent. Despite this difference in the kind of “acquisition” measured, the
surveys arguably yield a sound assessment of pupils’ attainment in mathematics, science and
reading.
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Finally, as the adjustments are based on scores obtained by the United States of America,
irrespective of the methodology used, the database cannot include surveys in which the
United States of America has not taken part, such as regional SACMEQ, PASEC, LLECE and
MLA surveys. Another methodology that would include regional surveys have been used, but
it has its own drawbacks.
3. Model and results
In this section, we estimate the educational production function. We start by presenting the
general model. The following subsection describes the econometric techniques used to correct
estimation bias. Finally, we discuss the results of the estimations.
3.1. The model
We estimate the educational production function using qualitative indicators of human
capital (QIHC) and the net enrollment ratio at secondary school level. The educational
production function includes both input and output indicators.
Two different variables are used for educational output, including the scores in student
skill tests (QIHC). In order to compare our results with the classic indicator of education
quality, a second indicator is used. The net enrollment ratio at secondary level (NERSEC) can
be considered as a measure of the performance of an educational system. Clearly, this cannot
be treated as a formal indicator of student performance; nevertheless, if a large proportion of
students succeed in leaving the secondary level without either dropping-out or repeating
years, we can assume that the good performance of the educational system is at least partly
responsible. Family factors are represented by a proxy variable of parents’ education. This is
measured by the number of years spent at school by adults aged 25 and over (ADEDU). It
should be noted that this variable can also measure the education level of the teachers. There
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are four variables relating to school resources. The first concerns government spending on
education. This is measured on the basis of each country’s effort, not in absolute terms: we
therefore use a variable measuring educational expenditure per student for each educational
level as a percentage of GDP per capita (SHPUPP and SHPUPS for primary and secondary
schools respectively). However, as Lee and Barro (2001) observe, as private spending is not
taken into account by these variables, there may be important errors of measurement. To
verify the validity of our results, we also use the indicator of educational expenditure as a
percentage of GNP (EXPGNP). Unfortunately, this indicator reflects the whole of educational
expenditure, not the spending on particular levels. Teachers’ pay is also measured in relation
to GDP per capita (SHSALP). Class size represents another resource factor (TEAPRI and
TEASEC for the primary and secondary levels respectively). Unlike Lee and Barro (2001), we
include the repetition rates as an input indicator, because we believe it has more to do with a
choice of educational policy than a question of educational efficiency (REPPRI and REPSEC
for the primary and secondary levels respectively). Lastly, it is also possible to consider the
level of educational inequalities as a lever of economic policy. A country may quite
deliberately choose to favour selective access to a given level of education and so accentuate
inequalities in schooling. For that reason, we include the indicators of educational inequalities
(INEDU) in the estimation.
It is important to note that the panel is unbalanced and the number of observations varies
considerably depending on the estimations. For example, less than 200 observations are
available with the indicators of educational quality in mathematics at the secondary level.
Using the net enrollment rate for secondary education provides about 370 observations. We
now move on to discuss the regression methods used.
13
3.2. Regression methods used
We employ several econometric techniques to estimate the educational production
function. We start by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, introducing dummies
for the different years in order to capture intrinsic temporal variations. As we cannot, in this
case, use the whole database of test scores, we restrict it to the indicators of the quality of
schooling in mathematics. The model is written as follows:
ittitititit vsfq    1211 (1)
where q denotes educational output, f denotes family factors, s covers all the school
resource variables,  represents indicator variables for the years and v denotes the error
term. The index i represents the country level and the index t the temporal level. The sample
is unbalanced and the intervals are every 5 years, from 1965 through to 2000, so we have 7
different periods.
Random-effects estimation assumes that the relations between inputs and outputs are
distributed randomly between countries and between years. Now, it is highly probable that
unobserved effects of countries are present in the estimations and interfere with the ß. If such
is the case, then the relations found in a random-effects estimation are potentially biased. To
correct this bias, we then perform a fixed-effects estimation. Here, the estimator is that of the
panel OLS with dummy variables  for each country i, and dummy variables  pour for
each year t:
itititititit vsfq    1211 (2)
There are three main reasons why the relation described above might be biased when the
fixed effects are taken into account. Firstly, there may be no direct relation between an
14
educational investment or a form of organization of education in a country and the school
performance in that same country. In this case, the relations found with the fixed-effects
estimator can be biased in many different ways and indicate significant relations where there
are none. Another possible reason comes from measurement errors in the estimation of the
quality of education. If, for example, the measurement errors are greater for a specific year,
the fixed-effects estimator tends to bias the specification even further. Another likely reason
arises out of the problem of endogeneity. For example, if a country can improve its education
quality by reducing the size of classes, the opposite relation is equally possible: it can reduce
class size because its population has access to high-quality education. The same relation of
reciprocal causality may exist for the other variables. Because of this bias of causality, the
fixed-effects estimator itself may be biased. To correct all these biases, we use the generalized
method-of-moments estimator, where the endogenous variables are instrumented by the
values of the lags of the same variables. In this case, we estimate the following equation:
ittititit usfq    1211 (3)
As can be seen, we regress the variation of output with the variation of each of the inputs,
so as to purge the whole estimation of fixed effects. In this precise case, it is no longer the
level of an input that determines the level of an output, but the variation of the former that
determines the variation in the latter. The estimator we use consists in adding instruments in
levels to the classic instruments, so as to form a system of the generalized method-of-
moments. To correct these biases, we use another regressor, that of the generalized method of
moments (the GMM system), with an application by Blundell and Bond (1998). This
regression is performed on a dynamic panel model and uses the levels and lags of endogenous
variables as instruments. While Arellano and Bond (1991) use the first-difference estimator to
avoid the correlation between the lagged values of the dependent variable and the fixed
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effects included in the term of error, Arellano and Bover (1995) again include the equations
expressed in levels, in addition to the lagged values of the first differences, to avoid being
confronted with the problem of the validity of the instruments, as highlighted by Staiger and
Stock (1997). In addition, they show that the inclusion of equations in levels considerably
increases the accuracy of the estimators, particularly when the auto-correlation of the
dependent variable is strong.
However, the total number of instruments sometimes becomes too high in relation to the
observations, sometimes even higher than the number of countries included in the panel.
Because of the new level constraints introduced, this problem arises more often with the
Blundell and Bond estimator (1998) that we use for our regressions. The improvement made
by Roodman (2006) to this estimator in the Stata© software enables us to use an original
method to limit the problem of the number of instruments. The "collapse" option in Stata can
be used to restrict the number of instruments by only considering some of the lagged variables
instead of all of them. In our analysis, this option is only used when the number of
observations is lower than 200, in other words when the qualitative indicators of human
capital are used to measure school performance and sub-samples are used. With Blundell and
Bond’s estimator (1998), we have a choice between one-step and two-step estimation. The
simulations carried out by Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that two-step estimation can
improve the accuracy of estimated coefficients and considerably increase the quality of the
estimation in the event of heteroskedasticity, but the standard errors tend to be systematically
undervalued. For this reason, we have chosen not to use the two-step version.
It is important to note that we make use of proxy variables, notably in order to take family
factors into account. As McCallum (1972) demonstrates, when there are no errors in the
measurement of either the proxy variables or the other inputs, it is preferable to include such
16
variables in the specification. Nevertheless, we are still confronted with the problem of
whether the use of such proxies might not add even more bias to the model. For example, we
use the variable of educational expenditure per student as a proxy to offset the lack of other
educational inputs, assuming that it can explain all the educational inputs. But the inclusion of
such a proxy can induce an even greater estimation bias (Wolpin, 1995, 1997; Todd and
Wolpin, 2003). Todd and Wolpin (2003) show that the use of proxies in an educational
production function can complicate the interpretation of coefficients. They consider the
example of a model relating performance to an input such as class size. To avoid having to
leave out the missing variables for other inputs, a researcher might include a variable such as
the level of educational expenditure per student. However, it is perfectly possible that schools
with the same level of spending per student, but with smaller-sized classes, spend less on
other, unobservable variables (such as employing less experienced teachers). Consequently,
the effect of class size on school performance, with a given level of educational spending per
student, is measured with the hypothesis of constancy in the unobservable input factors. If
class size and unobservable inputs are not correlated, then the bias due to omitted variables is
null in the model without proxy. By including the proxy of educational expenditure in the
regression, we assume that the variations in class size are merged with the variations in
unobserved inputs. In this sense, the inclusion of proxies can exacerbate the biases.
Alternatively, proxies such as income per capita or educational expenditure can be used to
verify the importance of biases due to omitted variables. These biases exist if the inclusion of
these proxies affects school performance, with the other inputs remaining unchanged. If it
turns out that the effects of included inputs change considerably when the proxies are
included in the regression, Wolpin (1995) shows that the researcher cannot know which of the
estimations is the least biased. For these reasons, we estimate each regression again, using one
sole input each time, but including the variable of the educational level of adults to control for
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family effects. As we use a fixed-effects estimator and the generalized methods-of-moment
estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998), the fixed effects are purged, which theoretically limits
the biases due to omitted variables. Consequently, with such estimators, the inclusion of only
part of the variables in the regression should not lead to an overestimation of their impact on
educational output.
3.3. Results of the estimations
In Table 3, we estimate the educational production function with random effects using the
results of mathematics tests at secondary level and the net enrollment ratio at secondary level
as output indicators (equation 1). To capture the variations due uniquely to the temporal
dimension, we introduce indicator variables for each year considered. Fisher’s test of global
significance of the indicators for each year shows the importance of incorporating them into
the estimation. Even when their significance is rejected at the 10% level, the value of the
other coefficients is not changed. In addition, the standard deviations are corrected by the
cluster method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) shows the analysis carried out on the basis of the first spending indicator, i.e.
educational expenditure per student at secondary level as a percentage of GDP per capita.
Only the variable of the educational level of adults is positive and significant. Whatever other
inputs are included, their coefficients are never significant. The relations are different with the
use of net enrolment ratio (NER) as output indicator (columns 7 to 12). Likewise, the
educational level of adults has a positive and significant relation to the enrollment rate.
Educational expenditure is either negatively correlated (column 7), or not significant (column
8). Teachers’ pay is negatively correlated with both of the outputs used, but only significantly
with the enrollment rate. In addition, the same negative relation exists for class size and for
the repetition rates. Only the coefficients in the estimation with the enrollment rate are
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significant. Lastly, despite a negative coefficient, educational inequalities do not appear to
have an impact on school performance, whichever output is used.
These results may be biased, because our estimations consider that the variations in the
different variables between and within countries are distributed randomly. Moreover it is
probable that omitted variables exist which influence both inputs and outputs, thus leading to
estimation biases. Table 5 presents the fixed-effects estimations, where we include the
indicator variables for each country. When the fixed effects are taken into account, the inputs
no longer appear to have any effect on educational performance, whatever the nature of this
latter. Even the variable of the educational level of adults is only significant for 3 estimations
out of a total of 12 (columns 7, 9 and 10), which raises doubts about its actual effect on school
performance. When the test scores are used, no variable is significant. The samples are
relatively small and in general we only have three observations for each country considered.
Still, if the sample size was the main problem, we should obtain more significant results when
we use net enrollment rates. But this is not the case. Only educational inequalities appear to
have a negative influence on the enrollment rate at secondary level. A reduction of one
standard deviation in the level of educational inequalities induces an increase of about 11
percent. This effect is very powerful, but the causal relation between enrollment rate and the
level of educational inequalities is not controlled for by the fixed-effects method of
regression. To correct these biases, we use the generalized method-of-moments estimator.
The results of the estimation using the GMM system are presented in Table 6. As in the
previous estimations, the estimations are performed with a limited number of independent
variables, to avoid bias in the estimated coefficients. There is no possible bias due to the
presence of omitted variables, because the estimation is made on the rates of variation, which
theoretically eliminates the unobservable characteristics. In columns 1 to 6, we use the student
test scores as output, while columns 7 to 12 show the results of estimations using the
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enrollment rate. When we use the test scores, only the variable relating to parents’ income is
significant: an increase of one standard deviation in the educational level of adults (i.e. about
2.7 years in 1995) induces an increase of about 6 percent in student scores, representing more
than double the impact when the regression is performed with random effects (2.72 × 2.22 =
6.04). When the variable of educational expenditure is introduced, it is still not positive and
significant. Even more importantly, its impact appears to be negative and significant for the
enrollment rate. The other indicator of educational expenditure also produces negative, but
not significant coefficients. This strengthens our idea of the lack of relation between the level
of spending on education and the quality of education. None of the other inputs has a direct
influence on the quality of education when the test scores are used as output. With the
enrollment rate as output, teachers’ pay even has a negative and significant effect on it.
Educational inequalities also have a negative, significant impact on the enrollment rate.
Consequently, when the estimation biases are controlled for, the educational production
function loses its relevance. At most, the educational level of adults explains the level of
school performance.
It should be noted that both educational performance and the structure of educational
systems differ strongly between different countries and different economic levels. In this case,
it is possible that our estimations are biased because they include very diverse countries,
notably both developed and developing countries. Although Blundell and Bond’s estimator
(1998) is usually operated with fixed effects, we require each country to follow one sole
production function. To verify this hypothesis, we estimate the above specifications once
again, distinguishing between the economic levels of the countries. As our sample is fairly
small, we have chosen to distinguish between OECD countries and non-OECD countries. The
results presented in Table 7 show that the difference in the educational production function
between countries of different economic levels is not proven. Only four variables are
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significant. It is important to note that the samples are very small, and this may reduce the
significance of the coefficients. Notwithstanding, it is surprising to observe that the
educational level of adults seems no longer to have an effect on test scores when the
distinction is made between countries of different economic levels. Only two estimations for
the non-OECD countries produce a positive and significant impact of the educational level of
adults. Educational expenditure has no effect on test scores, whatever the economic level of
the countries considered. In an unremarkable way, teachers’ pay has a negative and significant
impact on the quality of education for the developing countries (column 9). The increase of a
standard deviation of teachers’ pay (i.e. a rise of 241% in 1995 for non-OECD countries)
induces a fall of 11 percent in the quality of education. This effect is about five times higher
than it is with the random-effects estimator and concerns all the countries in the sample
(column 3 in Table 7), but remains fairly weak considering that this increase in pay represents
a multiplication by more than 3. The size of classes has a positive effect for OECD countries
and negative for developing countries. However, the effect is only significant for the former
group. In any event, we observe no negative and significant effect, whatever the economic
level of the countries considered. In addition, the repetition rates have a negative and
significant impact for the developing countries. Here, the effect of repeated years is very
strong: a reduction of one standard deviation (i.e. 7.3 in 1995 for the non-OECD countries)
induces an increase of 6 percent in the test scores. We repeat the same procedure with the
enrollment rate as the educational output (Table 8). The educational level of adults retains its
positive and significant effect, whatever the economic level of the countries. On average, the
impact of the educational level of adults on the enrollment rate is stronger for developing
countries than for OECD countries. In this difference, we can read a process of educational
convergence between countries with different economic levels. The impact of educational
expenditure is unconvincing, to say the least. Admittedly, its effect on the enrollment rate is
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positive and significant for OECD countries, but only at a level of significance of 10%. When
educational expenditure as a percentage of GNP is used as an alternative variable, the relation
disapears. The effects are equally contrasting for the developing countries, where only the use
of the second indicator produces a negative and significant relation. One quite surprising
result is the positive effect of repeated years on the enrollment rate in OECD countries. But
this appears to be of lower amplitude. These results underline the need to distinguish the
economic level of the countries clearly, which leads us to reject the existence of the
educational production function.
4. Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to determine the extent to which, within an
educational system, school resource factors have an impact on school quality. For this
purpose, we have estimated an educational production function. As it would for a firm, this
function relates inputs to an output. In this case, we have chosen two outputs. The first
concerns student scores in international achievement tests. It is reasonable to consider that the
performance of an educational system can be measured through student scores in standardized
tests of skills such as mathematics, science and reading. However, given the limited nature of
data on international tests, we have also used net enrollment rate at the secondary level. By
choosing such an indicator as an alternative to the international tests, we have favored the
quantitative dimension.
Each country seeks to achieve the best performance for its educational system, at the
lowest possible cost. As we have seen over the course of this paper, there is no established
relation between resource factors and the performance of an educational system. With the
growing globalization of economic activities, governments are more and more preoccupied
with the performances of their educational systems. It appears important to search for specific
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educational policies that can improve them. But increasing school resources have not
established effects on school quality at the macroeconomic level: educational systems are so
complex, and there are so many factors at work that it remains very difficult to search for the
sources of the quality of education.
What are the main reasons conducting to a lack of relationship between school resources
and the quality of education? We can think that there can be two main hypotheses. Firstly, as
we suggested it in the section 2.3., our data can suffer for measurement bias. Obviously, we
computed a new database, using many different surveys. Despite the meticulous work done
for making these data comparable, it could be possible that our analysis of difference-in-
difference may suffer for measurement error, as it is often the case in growth econometrics
estimations. However, it will never possible to obtain a precise measure of education quality,
since this is a multidimensional variable of the education system. The second reason of the
lack of relationship is perhaps an established lack of effect from school resources to education
quality. Why in a given country, due to an increase of school resources, will education quality
systematically improve?
Still, it remains fundamentally important for a country to evaluate the quality of its
educational system. International surveys surely have a promising future. If existing databases
of standardised skills tests remain limited in the number of observations, it may be possible to
verify the existence of an educational production function in the coming years, thanks to the
new surveys that are being conducted now or will be conducted in the future.
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Table 1 - Sources of data used
Indicator Abbreviation Period Source
Quality of education QIHC 1965-2002 Altinok and Murseli(2007)
Net enrollment rate in
secondary education NERSEC 1970-2005
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Parents’ education:
average number of years
schooling for adults aged
over 25
ADEDU 1960-2005
Barro and Lee (2001),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Govt. spending per
student at primary level
as % of GDP per capita
SHPUPP 1960-2002
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Govt. spending per
student at secondary
level as % of GDP per
capita
SHPUPS 1960-2002
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Govt. spending at
primary level as % of
GNP
EXPGNP 1970-2005 UNESCO-Institute forStatistics
Teachers’ pay at primary
level as % of GDP per
capita
SHSALP 1960-2002
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Class size at primary
level TEAPRI 1960-2005
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Class size at secondary
level TEASEC 1960-2005
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Repetition rates at
primary level REPPRI 1970-2005
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Repetition rates at
secondary level REPSEC 1970-2005
Barro and Lee (1996),
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
Indicators of educational
inequalities INEDU 1960-2000 Altinok (2007)
Expected number of
years in education EXPEN 1970-2005
UNESCO-Institute for
Statistics
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Table 2 – Student achievement tests used
Year Abbreviation Field Countries Age of students
1964 IEA Mathematics 13 13, Fin sec.
1970-72 IEA ScienceReading
19
15
10,14, Fin sec.
10,14, Fin sec.
1982-83 IEA Mathematics 20 13, Fin sec.
1984 IEA Science 24 10,14, Fin sec.
1988 IAEP MathematicsScience
6
6
13
13
1991 IEA Reading 31 9,14
1990-91 IAEP MathematicsScience
20
20
9,13
9,13
1993-98 IEA MathematicsScience
41
41
9,13, Fin sec.
9,13, Fin sec.
1992-97 UNESCO-MLA
Mathematics
Science
Reading
13
11
11
10
10
10
1997 UNESCO-LLECE MathematicsReading
11
11
10
10
1999 UNESCO-SACMEQ Reading 7 10
1999 IEA MathematicsScience
38
38
14
14
1995-2005 CONFEMEN-PASEC
Mathematics
Reading
11
11
9,10
9,10
2000 OECD-PISA
Mathematics
Science
Reading
43
43
43
15
15
15
2001 IEA Reading 35 9,10
2002 UNESCO-SACMEQ MathematicsReading
14
13
10
10
2003 IEA MathematicsScience
26,48
26,48
10,14
10,14
2003 OECD-PISA
Mathematics
Science
Reading
41
41
41
15
15
15
Note: Fin sec. denotes the final year of secondary school. Abbreviations: IAEP (International Assessment of
Educational Progress), IEA (International Association of the Evaluation of Educational Achievement), TIMSS
(Third International Mathematics and Science Study), PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study),
PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization), LLECE (Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education),
CONFEMEN (Conference of Ministers of Education in countries sharing the French language), PASEC
(Programme of Analysis of the CONFEMEN), SACMEQ (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for
Monitoring Educational Quality), MLA (Monitoring Learning Achievement).
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standarddeviation Min Max Obs Obs
QIHC Overall 51.58 10.06 18.75 78.31 N 244
Between 9.37 18.75 70.99 n 106
Within 5.52 24.53 64.83 T 2.30
NERSEC Overall 54.20 29.04 0.90 100 N 577
Between 27.62 2.30 97.5 n 158
Within 11.93 12.20 101.07 T 3.65
LNGDP Overall 8.19 1.07 5.77 10.69 N 1082
Between 0.99 6.25 10.03 n 146
Within 0.32 6.87 9.35 T 7.41
ADEDU Overall 4.60 2.83 0.04 12.25 N 1048
Between 2.48 0.41 10.86 n 169
Within 1.05 0.85 8.15 T 6.20
TEAPRI Overall 31.72 12.95 6.10 95.3 N 1296
Between 11.61 13.40 73.07 n 176
Within 5.93 10.89 56.77 T 7.36
TEASEC Overall 19.36 7.12 6 64 N 1149
Between 6.01 8 45.5 n 176
Within 4.27 -2.21 45.79 T 6.53
SHPUPP Overall 14.22 9.19 0.95 77.80 N 845
Between 9.43 2.27 49.76 n 156
Within 5.49 -10.39 54.64 T 5.42
SHPUPS Overall 39.08 60.86 2.1 693.8 N 816
Between 46.09 4.83 275.83 n 154
Within 40.52 -119.12 460.91 T 5.30
EXPGNP Overall 4.40 1.97 0 13.3 N 831
Between 1.87 0.78 13.3 n 174
Within 1.04 -0.45 9.33 T 4.78
SHSALP Overall 354.88 278.40 40 2684 N 714
Between 232.26 40 1396.25 n 145
Within 153.71 -431.38 1642.63 T 4.92
REPPRI Overall 10.36 9.28 0 47.5 N 996
Between 8.63 0 34.15 n 174
Within 3.50 -4.83 25.76 T 5.72
REPSEC Overall 9.54 8.24 0 46 N 819
Between 7.15 0 31.2 n 156
Within 3.95 -8.06 28.47 T 5.25
INEDU Overall 44.01 25.63 4.41 98.97 N 925
Between 24.62 7.13 92.27 n 109
Within 7.75 16.93 67.42 T 8.49
Note: For the abbreviations, see Table 1.
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Table 4 – Random-effects estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable Quality of education in mathematics at secondary level Net enrollment rate at secondary level
Education of adults t-1
1.101*
(0.367)
1.730*
(0.461)
0.831‡
(0.473)
1.486*
(0.453)
1.710*
(0.532)
1.024‡
(0.623)
7.902*
(0.463)
7.991*
(0.531)
7.846*
(0.589)
7.856*
(0.536)
7.856*
(0.536)
8.591*
(0.511)
Educational spending(1) t-1
0.037
(0.092)
-0.122*
(0.049)
Educational spending (2) t-1
-0.366
(0.493)
0.936
(0.740)
Teachers’ pay t-1
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.018†
(0.008)
Class size t-1
-0.167
(0.206)
-0.410†
(0.172)
Repetition rates t-1
-0.065
(0.165)
-0.410†
(0.172)
Educational inequalities t-1
-0.102
(0.109)
-0.031
(0.148)
F Test for time dummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Observations 156 148 119 143 117 161 373 388 308 420 420 352
Country 58 63 41 60 55 54 117 126 112 133 133 121
R² 0.47 0.31 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.69
Levels of significance: *1%. †5%. ‡10%. The numbers between brackets represent standard errors.
(1) Educational spending per student at secondary level as percentage of GDP per capita.
(2) Educational spending as percentage of GNP.
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Table 5 – Fixed-effects estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable Quality of education in mathematics at secondary level Net enrollment rate at secondary level
Education of adults t-1
1.776
(1.284)
0.288
(1.111)
1.931
(1.399)
0.637
(1.350)
2.194
(1.721)
1.378
(1.244)
3.129†
(1.361)
1.279
(1.514)
3.105‡
(1.850)
2.564‡
(1.369)
1.910
(1.822)
1.261
(1.246)
Educational spending(1) t-1
0.002
(0.115)
-0.052
(0.066)
Educational spending (2) t-1
0.967
(0.655)
0.742
(0.815)
Teachers’ pay t-1
0.007
(0.010)
0.008
(0.007)
Class size t-1
-0.137
(0.327)
0.191
(0.201)
Repetition rates t-1
0.038
(0.290)
0.176
(0.323)
Educational inequalities t-1
0.166
(0.200)
-0.485*
(0.146)
F Test for time dummies [0.53] [0.69] [0.33] [0.82] [0.24] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 156 148 119 143 117 161 373 388 308 420 352 416
Countries 58 63 41 60 55 54 117 126 112 133 121 96
R² 0.91 0.31 0.91 0.47 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.73 0.94 0.95
Levels of significance: *1%. †5%. ‡10%. The numbers between brackets represent the standard errors. The independent variables are lagged for a
period of 5 years.
(1) Educational spending per student at secondary level as percentage of GDP per capita.
(2) Educational spending as percentage of GNP.
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Table 6 - Estimation with GMM system
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable Quality of education in mathematics at secondary level Net enrollment rate at secondary level
Education of adults t-1
2.222*
(0.854)
2.053†
(0.857)
1.932‡
(1.092)
2.775*
(0.935)
1.735‡
(0.936)
2.991†
(1.218)
7.632*
(0.752)
7.210*
(0.885)
8.932*
(0.856)
9.044*
(0.866)
8.742*
(0.740)
3.398†
(1.485)
Educational spending(1) t-1
-0.036
(0.167)
-0.118†
(0.050)
Educational spending (2) t-1
-0.495
(1.154)
-1.444
(1.040)
Teachers’ pay t-1
-0.011
(0.016)
-0.022*
(0.009)
Class size t-1
-0.122
(0.370)
-0.226
(0.220)
Repetition rates t-1
0.181
(0.181)
0.064
(0.181)
Educational inequalities t-1
0.232
(0.252)
-0.690*
(0.223)
F Test for time dummies [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.07] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00]
Hansen’s test [0.32] [0.22] [0.36] [0.18] [0.47] [0.24] [0.80] [0.41] [0.96] [0.24] [0.29] [0.54]
AR(2) test [0.23] [0.20] [0.19] [0.76] [0.34] [0.74] [0.72] [0.76] [0.23] [0.26] [0.25] [0.21]
Observations 156 148 119 143 117 161 373 388 308 420 352 416
Countries 58 63 41 60 55 54 117 126 112 133 94 96
Levels of significance: *1%. †5%. ‡10%. The numbers between brackets represent the standard errors. The independent variables are lagged for a
period of 5 years.
(1) Educational spending per student at secondary level as percentage of GDP per capita.
(2) Educational spending as percentage of GNP.
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Table 7 - Estimation with test scores, sub-samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable Quality of education in mathematics at secondary level
Sample OECD countries Non-OECD countries
Education of adults t-1
1.259
(1.064)
-0.099
(0.980)
1.091
(0.855)
1.052
(0.762)
-0.965
(1.655)
0.433
(1.228)
1.668
(1.232)
1.783†
(0.871)
1.204
(1.363)
0.864
(1.278)
1.501†
(0.752)
2.651
(1.849)
Educational spending(1) t-1
0.031
(0.149)
0.085
(0.220)
Educational spending (2) t-1
0.127
(0.923)
-0.362
(1.080)
Teachers’ pay t-1
-0.003
(0.018)
-0.055‡
(0.031)
Class size t-1
0.407‡
(0.211)
-0.472
(0.426)
Repetition rates t-1
0.419
(0.397)
-0.837‡
(0.493)
Educational inequalities t-1
-0.072
(0.198)
0.048
(0.364)
F Test for time dummies [0.11] [0.03] [0.12] [0.01] [0.03] [0.07] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Hansen’s test [0.57] [0.35] [0.27] [0.40] [0.83] [0.38] [0.34] [0.78] [0.99] [0.64] [0.62] [0.52]
AR(2) Test [0.87] [0.79] [0.79] [0.68] [0.57] [0.67] [0.30] [0.79] - [0.67] [0.60] [0.76]
Observations 106 91 90 88 67 111 50 57 29 55 50 50
Countries 22 28 22 28 24 28 29 35 16 32 31 26
Levels of significance: *1%. †5%. ‡10%. The numbers between brackets represent the standard errors. The independent variables are lagged for a
period of 5 years.
(1) Educational spending per student at secondary level as percentage of GDP per capita.
(2) Educational spending as percentage of GNP.
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Table 8 - Estimation with net enrollment rate, sub-samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
System GMM
Sample OECD countries Non-OECD countries
Education of adults t-1
4.547*
(1.190)
1.726‡
(0.967)
6.154*
(1.469)
5.343*
(1.388)
3.009†
(1.313)
1.848
(2.034)
6.205*
(2.513)
8.516*
(2.552)
6.145*
(2.161)
8.051*
(2.134)
5.771†
(2.902)
8.080*
(2.388)
Educational spending(1) t-1
0.431‡
(0.218)
-0.093
(0.063)
Educational spending (2) t-1
0.308
(1.382)
-1.807‡
(1.114)
Teachers’ pay t-1
-0.015
(0.016)
-0.007
(0.016)
Class size t-1
-0.431
(0.614)
-0.261
(0.266)
Repetition rates t-1
0.245*
(0.061)
0.594
(0.674)
Educational inequalities t-1
-0.421
(0.364)
-0.464
(0.339)
F Test for time dummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.57] [0.05] [0.10] [0.05] [0.15]
Hansen’s test [0.31] [0.48] [0.18] [0.60] [0.63] [0.31] [0.16] [0.61] [0.25] [0.16] [0.38] [0.82]
AR(2) Test [0.18] [0.47] [0.12] [0.96] [0.76] [0.47] [0.41] [0.92] [0.23] [0.21] [0.55] [0.18]
Observations 146 133 126 129 89 158 227 255 182 291 263 258
Countries 27 28 27 28 26 27 26 98 85 105 95 69
Levels of significance: *1%. †5%. ‡10%. The numbers between brackets represent the standard errors. The independent variables are lagged for a
period of 5 years.
(1) Educational spending per student at secondary level as percentage of GDP per capita.
(2) Educational spending as percentage of GNP.
